The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 32, Issue 4, pp 331–338 | Cite as

The political economy of the collaborative innovation bloc

  • David S. LucasEmail author
Original Research


In this issue, Elert and Henrekson offer an important and promising framework through which Austrian scholars to contribute to the study of entrepreneurship and innovation. I suggest a way to build upon their framework: incorporating insights from public choice. While Elert and Henrekson downplay self-interest in their institutional analysis, public choice offers important insights about the formation of public policies that affect innovation activity. Without this, a gap exists among the identification of institutional bottlenecks that hinder collaboration in the innovation bloc and the subsequent alleviation of those bottlenecks. Infusing public choice assumptions into the Collaborative Innovation Bloc framework reveals several promising areas for future research.


Collaborative innovation bloc Austrian economics Innovation finance Political economy Public choice 

JEL codes

B53 L26 O31 O38 



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Whitman School of ManagementSyracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

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