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Blockchain, bank credit and SME financing

  • Rui Wang
  • Zhangxi Lin
  • Hang Luo
Article
  • 127 Downloads

Abstract

Blockchain is an emerging decentralized architecture and distributed computing paradigm and has recently attracted intensive attention from all sectors of society. This paper sets up a theoretical model to analyze a new credit pattern that allows small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) assessing bank loans through the blochchain technology. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that the blockchain technology enables the decentralized consensus recording of success of debt repayment or debt default rendered by verifying and validating certain lending and borrowing activities in distributed ledgers. In the newly proposed blockchain embedded credit system, SMEs with low-risk and high-quality could display their credibility and risk class through information distribution. They are more likely to access bank loans even if they are not able to provide collateral. Results derived from the theoretical model present two main findings. First, the alleviation of information asymmetry and credit rationing problems can be achieved through decentralized consensus and information distribution among all participants. Second, the risk sharing mechanism involving government, banks and firms, will not only make the establishment of such an innovative system possible, but also create risk pool for the blockchain based lending and borrowing.

Keywords

Blockchain Credit rationing Information asymmetry SMEs financing 

JEL Classification

G21 G30 O33 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research is financially supported by Key Scientific Research Fund of Xihua University (Funding No. ZW17136) and Department of Science and Technology of Sichuan Province (Funding No. 2018ZR0296).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsXihua UniversityChengduChina

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