The Stackelberg differential game for counter-terrorism
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The Stackelberg approach of the differential game is important to fight terrorism, that is through government tasks such as education improvement, solving the unemployment problems, justice in the society, knowledge of true religion and the security, this approach is a hierarchical solution of a differential game, leader, and followers. This study is divided into two stages; stage 1: the government is the leader and the terrorist organization is the follower. Stage 2: the terrorist organization is the leader and government is the follower, we study the analytic form of this approach for obtaining the optimal strategy to fight terrorism.
Keywords(I) Game theory Fighting the terrorism Stackelberg Optimal strategy
Mathematics Subject Classification49N70 49N90 91A23
My highly grateful and appreciation to the Basic Sciences Research Unit, Deanship of Scientific Research at Majmaah University for funding this study, Project No. 37/34, 1437 h-2016 ad.
Compliance with ethical standards
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that I have no conflict of interest.
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