A model of terrorism and counterterrorism with location choices
- 138 Downloads
We study a model of terrorism and counterterrorism with three geographic target locations, in which the last location is chosen by the terrorists and is unknown to the defender. We find the choice of location and defender’s allocation of defensive resources to depend on whether the first two locations are attacked simultaneously or sequentially. In the sequential-move game, the final attack is closer to the low-valued target than it is in the simultaneous-move game. In addition, the defender chooses to defend only the location that is attacked first in the sequential game. Results from the model also can shed light on less provocative criminal events such as bank robberies and drug dealings.
KeywordsTerrorism Location Defense Simultaneous Sequential
We thank the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, which have significantly improved the qualify of the paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at Jinan University, South China Normal University, and the 28th International Conference on Game Theory. We thank seminar and conference participants especially Timothy Mathews, Shane Sanders, Xianbin Wang, and Zhibo Wang for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are ours.
- Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2005a). Conciliation, counterterrorism, and patterns of terrorist violence. International Organization, 59, 145–176.Google Scholar
- Kovenock D, Roberson B (2017) The optimal defense of networks of targets. http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/230
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2016) Global terrorism database [data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
- Skaperdas, S. (1992). Cooperation, conflict, and power in the absence of property rights. American Economic Review, 82(4), 720–739.Google Scholar
- Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J. Buchanan, R. Tollison, & G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society (pp. 97–1120). College Station: Texas A&M University Press.Google Scholar