Public Choice

, Volume 180, Issue 3–4, pp 243–256 | Cite as

Adaptation and central banking

  • Alexander W. Salter
  • William J. LutherEmail author


What or who governs central bank decisions? Most considerations focus on motivations. Instead, we consider the extent to which specific behaviors have adaptive value in the context of central banking. From that perspective, poor decisions are not the product of poor motivations. They are, instead, a product of the poor institutions within which central bank decision makers operate.


Adaptation Bailout Central bank Motivation Seigniorage Selection Research 

JEL Classification

E31 E42 E52 E58 



We thank David Andolfatto, Gerald P. Dwyer, Jerry Jordan, Peter Leeson, Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr., William F. Shughart II, and Lawrence H. White for providing valuable comments on an earlier draft of this work.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rawls College of BusinessTexas Tech UniversityLubbockUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsFlorida Atlantic UniversityBoca RatonUSA

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