Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which ‘essentially indexical’ information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.
KeywordsFormal Epistemology Time-Slice Rationality Sleeping Beauty Self-locating Belief Accuracy Personal Identity
Thanks to Miriam Schoenfield, Jack Spencer, Roger White, and an anonymous referee for helpful feedback.
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