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Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief

  • David BuilesEmail author
Article

Abstract

The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which ‘essentially indexical’ information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.

Keywords

Formal Epistemology Time-Slice Rationality Sleeping Beauty Self-locating Belief Accuracy Personal Identity 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Miriam Schoenfield, Jack Spencer, Roger White, and an anonymous referee for helpful feedback.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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