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Peer disagreement and counter-examples

  • Ruth WeintraubEmail author
Article

Abstract

Two kinds of considerations are thought to be relevant to the correct response to the discovery of a peer who disagrees with you about some question. The first is general principles pertaining to disagreement. According to the second kind of consideration, a theory about the correct response to peer disagreement must conform to our intuitions about test cases. In this paper, I argue against the assumption that imperfect conformity to our intuitions about test cases must count against a theory about peer disagreement, offer a principled way of (sometimes) shrugging off a theory’s failure to deliver the intuitive verdict, and consider the main extant theories from the new methodological perspective.

Keywords

Peer disagreement Conciliationism Test-cases 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentTel-Aviv UniversityRamat-AvivIsrael

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