Defending truth values for indicative conditionals

  • Kelly Weirich


There is strong disagreement about whether indicative conditionals have truth values. In this paper, I present a new argument for the conclusion that indicative conditionals have truth values based on the claim that some true statements entail indicative conditionals. I then address four arguments that conclude that indicative conditionals lack truth values, showing them to be inadequate. Finally, I present further benefits to having a worldly view of conditionals, which supports the assignment of truth values to indicative conditionals. I conclude that certain types of account of indicative conditionals, which have been ignored in the literature partly on the basis of assigning truth values to indicative conditionals, deserve consideration.


Indicative conditionals Truth values Language Probability 



Many thanks to anonymous reviewers at Philosophical Studies for helpful and formative comments. Thanks to David Barnett and Graeme Forbes for extensive comments on previous versions of Sects. 2 and 3 and to Scott Weirich for helpful feedback.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.TacomaUSA

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