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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 6, pp 1439–1451 | Cite as

Evaluative predicates as classificatory devices?

  • Tristram McPhersonEmail author
Article
  • 41 Downloads

Abstract

In “Value Ascriptions: Rethinking Cognitivism,” Sigrún Svavarsdóttir offers a novel account of the semantic function of evaluative predication, according to which such predicates function as “linguistically encoded classificatory devices.” This short paper raises three questions about Svavarsdóttir’s account: how it relates to familiar sorts of projects in and about semantics, how to understand the nature of “linguistic encoding,” and how to understand the significance of the account’s central use of sets.

Keywords

Moral semantics Predication Cognitivism Expressivism Minimalism 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Sigrún Svavarsdóttir for helpful discussion of her paper, and to Derek Baker and David Plunkett for illuminating comments on a draft of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ohio State UniversityColumbusUSA

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