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Deceiving without answering

  • Peter van ElswykEmail author
Article

Abstract

Lying is standardly distinguished from misleading according to how a disbelieved proposition is conveyed. To lie, a speaker uses a sentence to say a proposition she does not believe. A speaker merely misleads by using a sentence to somehow convey but not say a disbelieved proposition. Front-and-center to the lying/misleading distinction is a conception of what-is-said by a sentence in a context. Stokke (Philos Rev 125(1):83–134, 2016, Lying and insincerity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) has recently argued that the standard account of lying/misleading is explanatorily inadequate unless paired with a theory where what-is-said by a sentence is determined by the question under discussion or qud. I present two objections to his theory, and conclude that no extant theory of what-is-said enables the standard account of the lying/misleading distinction to be explanatorily adequate.

Keywords

Lying Misleading Lying/misleading distinction What is said Question under discussion qud 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks are owed to Liz Camp, Chris Willard-Kyle, Jeff King, Nico Kirk-Giannini, Carolina Flores, Joshua Spencer, and two referees for helpful comments or conversation.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Wisconsin–MilwaukeeMilwaukeeUSA

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