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What we epistemically owe to each other

  • Rima Basu
Article
  • 42 Downloads

Abstract

This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other.

Keywords

Epistemic duties Epistemic obligations Doxastic wronging Ethics of belief Wronging beliefs 

Notes

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments and discussions, there are a lot of people I want to draw special attention to and I apologize to anyone I forget. In alphabetical order: Mike Ashfield, Renee Bolinger, Endre Begby, Stephen Bero, Kenny Easwaran, Stephen Finlay, Pamela Hieronymi, Gabbrielle Johnson, Robin Jeshion, Shieva Kleinschmidt, Dustin Locke, Maegan Fairchild, Kathryn Pogin, Mark Schroeder, Regina Rini, Briana Toole, Ralph Wedgwood, and Aaron Zimmerman. Additionally, I’d like to thank audiences at Claremont McKenna College, Princeton University, the 2018 Pacific division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, and the Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Claremont McKenna CollegeClaremontUSA

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