Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 3, pp 693–707 | Cite as

Wierenga on theism and counterpossibles

  • Fabio LampertEmail author


Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails.


Counterpossibles Counterfactuals Theism Possible worlds Impossible worlds David Lewis 



I would like to thank an anonymous referee for comments and encouragement.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Logic and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of California, IrvineIrvineUSA

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