Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 2, pp 321–338 | Cite as

Knowledge requires commitment (instead of belief)

  • Nicholas Tebben


I argue that S knows that p implies that S is properly committed to the truth of p, not that S believes that p. Belief is not required for knowledge because it is possible that one could know that there are no beliefs. Being ‘properly committed’ to the truth of a proposition is a matter of having a certain normative status, not occupying a particular psychological state. After arguing that knowledge requires commitment instead of belief, I go on to demonstrate the theoretical utility of this hypothesis.


Knowledge Commitment Acceptance 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Religious StudiesTowson UniversityTowsonUSA

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