Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 18, Issue 3, pp 603–620 | Cite as

Bodily and temporal pre-reflective self-awareness

  • Constantinos Picolas
  • Nikos SoueltzisEmail author

It is something of a common view among phenomenological thinkers that when a subject undergoes an experience that subject is not only conscious of the intentional object of that experience but she is also implicitly conscious of experiencing that object.1 This self-awareness is often called pre-reflective in the positive sense that it is an immediate/first-order non-reflective awareness and in the negative sense that it is there already prior to its reflective thematization.2

If one takes perceptual experience into account one observes that its objects are essentially characterized by temporal duration during which they appear as diachronic unities. In correlation to that the object’s temporal duration is given in a lived-experience which itself exhibits temporal duration. Duration, in both cases, is not a contingent feature merely added, as it were, “externally” to them. We are always aware of objects and of the correlative experiences as being temporally stretched. Husserl has...


Pre-reflective self-awareness Bodily self-awareness Kinaesthesis Sense of ownership Sense of agency Protention 


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PatrasPetrasGreece

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