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Neuroscience and Behavioral Physiology

, Volume 49, Issue 5, pp 644–649 | Cite as

Guarded Optimism in Questions of Free Will (comments on objections received)

  • D. N. RazeevEmail author
Article
  • 4 Downloads

This paper provides comments on the objections received from colleagues to my paper “The problem of free will in the context of neuroscience research.” The author clarifies some aspects of his article and emphasizes his previous thesis: data from contemporary neuroscience do not evidence our lack of free will, though they do not confirm that it exists. From the author’s point of view, adequate investigation of the phenomenon of free will requires creation of a new experimental paradigm by scientists of different specialties.

Keywords

free will freedom of action V. M. Allakhverdov V. V. Vasilyev D. I. Dubrovsky A. M. Ivanitsky V. A. Klucharev 

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References

  1. Allakhverdov, V. M., “Consciousness and the problem of free will,” Zh. Vyssh. Nerv. Deyat., 67, No. 6, 734–738 (2017).Google Scholar
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  5. Klucharev, V. A., “Free will: a neuroeconomic approach,” Zh. Vyssh. Nerv. Deyat., 67, No. 6, 755–760 (2017).Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of the Philosophy of Science and TechnologySt. Petersburg State UniversitySt. PetersburgRussia

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