Consciousness and the Problem of Free Will
This brief commentary on the papers by A. M. Ivanitsky and D. N. Razeev makes an attempt to show why the problem of free will cannot be solved “in the context of neuroscience.” An approach to solving this problem in the logic of conscious activity is proposed.
Keywordsfree will determinism consciousness cognition paradox
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