How Can We Defend Free Will Conceptually?
This paper discusses the argument put forward by Razeev against a series of experimental attempts to demonstrate the possible absence of free will from humans. The author is in agreement with Razeev’s general approach but takes a different view in understanding what intellectual means are needed to neutralize these experiments.
KeywordsD. N. Razeev freedom of will freedom of action freedom of desire Libet’s experiment
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