Allocation and pricing of group-buying based on the fixed bidding
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Online group-buying is a popular business mode based on Internet. Group-buying websites can get discount for goods or services through promotion and other means which used to gather enough number of people, and sellers can also sell more quantities of goods. However, the existing group-buying mode is that all buyers unify the fixed pricing, the mechanism cannot distinguish the contribution of different buyers and motivate buyers report truthfully. In this paper, an online group-buying pricing method based on buyer’s fixed bidding is proposed in view of the influence of buyer’s bidding price and demand quantity on the participants’ group in the group-buying mechanism. We introduce the concept of relative importance to the allocation and pricing of mechanisms and propose a new mechanism named Fixed bids Truthful Mechanism for Group Buying (FTM4GB) based on correlation importance. At the end of the paper, we prove the economic attributes of individual rationality, incentive compatibility and budget balance.
KeywordsIncentive compatibility Group-buying mechanism Allocation and pricing
This work was supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China under Grant 61872313, Grant 61170201, Grant 61070133, and Grant 61472344, the key research projects in education informatization in Jiangsu province Grant 20180012, in part by the Postgraduate Research and Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province under Grant KYCX18_2366, in part by the Natural Science Foundation of the Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions under Grant 14KJB520041, in part by the Advanced Joint Research Project of Technology Department of Jiangsu Province under Grant BY2015061-06 and Grant BY2015061-08, and in part by the Yangzhou Science and Technology under Grant YZ2017288 and YZ2018076, and Yangzhou University Jiangdu High-end Equipment Engineering Technology Research Institute Open Project under Grant YDJD201707.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interests
We declare that we have no financial and personal relationships with other people or organizations that can inappropriately influence our work, there is no professional or other personal interest of any nature or kind in any product, service and/or company that could be construed as influencing the position presented in, or the review of, the manuscript entitled, ’Allocation and Pricing of Group-Buying Based on the Fixed Bidding of Buyer’.
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