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Duopoly Provision of Services Based on Wireless Sensor-supplied Data: a Differential Game Model

  • Angel Sanchis-Cano
  • Luis Guijarro
  • Vicent Pla
  • Jose R. Vidal
Article
  • 16 Downloads

Abstract

The provision of services based on wireless sensor data is analyzed dynamically. In the proposed scenario, two competing service providers deploy their own wireless sensor networks in order to collect the data and provide services to final users. The service providers compete in prices dynamically in order to maximize their profits, while the behavior of the users is modeled using a discrete choice model. The model is analyzed using game theory. The changes in the population of users are analyzed through an evolutionary game and the Logit dynamic, while the dynamic competition in prices is studied using a differential game. We conclude that the dynamic pricing competition is economically feasible for the service providers and, in addition, the dynamic solution converges to the static solution of the scenario.

Keywords

Wireless sensor networks Network economics Dynamic pricing Differential game Internet of things Game theory 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ITACAUniversitat Politècnica de ValènciaValenciaSpain

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