Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy

, Volume 21, Issue 3, pp 303–309 | Cite as

Incentivized goodness

  • Vojin RakićEmail author
Scientific Contribution


It will be argued that humans have a rational self-interest in voluntarily opting to subject themselves to moral bioenhancement. This interest is based on the fact that goodness appears to be conducive to happiness. Those who understand that will be more inclined to opt for safe and effective moral bioenhancement technologies that have the potential to augment our motivation to become better. The more people decide to follow this path, the likelier it is that states will adopt suitable policies that incentivize moral bioenhancement. Hence, goodness, happiness and state incentivized moral bioenhancement can operate in a circularly supportive fashion.


Moral bioenhancement Incentivized goodness Happiness Freedom Moral reflection Ultimate harm Self-interest State incentives Circularly supportive mechanism 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for the Study of Bioethics, Institute of Social Sciences, European Division of the UNESCO Chair in BioethicsUniversity of BelgradeBelgradeSerbia

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