Thomas Kuhn, The American philosopher
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Most of the debates around the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn revolve around the descriptive tenability of the model of scientific progress developed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962/1996). Critics and supporters of Kuhn often try to either falsify or corroborate his model by testing it against new case studies, or by revisiting well-known historical episodes in more details. By doing so, however, they seem to take the objectivity of the historical data for granted, thus betraying a rather naive attitude towards the history of science. Furthermore, such historical tests of Kuhn’s model give the impression that something important about his thought is being missed.
Bojana Mladenović’s approach to Kuhn is different. She is not interested in rediscussing all the little details of the Kuhnian model to check whether it fits this or that historical episode. Her aim is to reconstruct Kuhn’s epistemology of science: what he thought about scientific knowledge, rationality and...
This paper was written during a period of postdoctoral research at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas of UNAM (Mexico), under the supervision of Prof. Atocha Aliseda.
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