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Journal of Mathematical Sciences

, Volume 244, Issue 2, pp 278–293 | Cite as

On Dynamic Aggregation Systems

  • N. L. Polyakov
  • M. V. ShamolinEmail author
Article
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Abstract

We consider consecutive aggregation procedures for individual preferences 𝔠 ∈ ℭr (A) on a set of alternatives A, |A| ≥ 3: on each step, the participants are subject to intermediate collective decisions on some subsets B of the set A and transform their a priori preferences according to an adaptation function 𝒜. The sequence of intermediate decisions is determined by a lot J, i.e., an increasing (with respect to inclusion) sequence of subsets B of the set of alternatives. An explicit classification is given for the clones of local aggregation functions, each clone consisting of all aggregation functions that dynamically preserve a symmetric set 𝔇 ⊆ ℭr (A) with respect to a symmetric set of lots 𝒥. On the basis of this classification, it is shown that a clone ℱ of local aggregation functions that preserves the set ℜ2 (A) of rational preferences with respect to a symmetric set 𝒥 contains nondictatorial aggregation functions if and only if 𝒥 is a set of maximal lots, in which case the clone ℱ is generated by the majority function. On the basis of each local aggregation function f, lot J, and an adaptation function 𝒜, one constructs a nonlocal (in general) aggregation function fJ,A that imitates a consecutive aggregation procesure. If f dynamically preserves a set 𝔇 ⊆ ℭr (A) with respect to a set of lots 𝒥, then the aggregation function fJ,A preserves the set 𝔇 for each lot J ∈ 𝒥. If 𝔇 = ℜ2(A), then the adaptation function can be chosen in such a way that in any profile c ∈ (ℜ2(A))n, the Condorcet winner (if it exists) would coincide with the maximal element with respect to the preferences fJ,A (c) for each maximal lot J and f that dynamically preserves the set of rational preferences with respect to the set of maximal lots.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Moscow State UniversityMoscowRussia

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