A Characterization of Nash Equilibrium for the Games with Random Payoffs
We consider a two-player random bimatrix game where each player is interested in the payoffs which can be obtained with certain confidence. The payoff function of each player is defined using a chance constraint. We consider the case where the entries of the random payoff matrix of each player jointly follow a multivariate elliptically symmetric distribution. We show an equivalence between the Nash equilibrium problem and the global maximization of a certain mathematical program. The case where the entries of the payoff matrices are independent normal/Cauchy random variables is also considered. The case of independent normally distributed random payoffs can be viewed as a special case of a multivariate elliptically symmetric distributed random payoffs. As for Cauchy distribution, we show that the Nash equilibrium problem is equivalent to the global maximization of a certain quadratic program. Our theoretical results are illustrated by considering randomly generated instances of the game.
KeywordsChance-constrained games Nash equilibrium Elliptically symmetric distribution Cauchy distribution Mathematical program Quadratic program
Mathematics Subject Classification91A10 90C15 90C20 90C26
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