The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 23, Issue 4, pp 387–406 | Cite as

Two Ways of Thinking About the Value of Deserved Punishment

  • Richard L. LippkeEmail author


Numerous retributivists hold that deserved punishment has intrinsic value. A number of puzzles regarding that claim are identified and discussed. An alternative, more Kantian account of intrinsic value is then identified and the ways in which legal punishment might be understood to cohere with it are explored. That account focuses on the various ways in which legal punishment might be persons-respecting. It is then argued that this Kantian account enables us to solve or evade the puzzles generated by the other intrinsic value account.


Retributivism Intrinsic value Deserved punishment 



I would like to thank Marcia Baron and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on previous drafts.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Criminal JusticeIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA

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