The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 317–332 | Cite as

Animalism, Abortion, and a Future Like Ours

  • Andrea SauchelliEmail author


Marquis’ future-like-ours argument against the morality of abortion assumes animalism—a family of theories according to which we are animals. Such an assumption is theoretically useful for various reasons, e.g., because it provides the theoretical underpinning for a reply to the contraception-abstinence objection. However, the connection between the future-like-ours argument and one popular version of animalism can prove lethal to the former, or so I argue in this paper.


Animalism Abortion Identity Future-like-ours argument Biological individuality Personal ontology 



Many thanks to the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful suggestions.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLingnan UniversityTuen MunHong Kong SAR

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