Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would consider appropriate for rational deliberation. Without a satisfactory response to this objection, Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism cannot be deemed successful.
Free will Free will skepticism Deliberation-compatibilism Deliberationincompatibilism Determinism Rational deliberation Pereboom Nelkin Kapitan Searle van Inwagen
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