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An improved mechanism for selfish bin packing

  • Xin Chen
  • Qingqin Nong
  • Qizhi FangEmail author
Article
  • 14 Downloads

Abstract

Selfish bin packing can be viewed as the non-cooperative version of bin packing problem, where every item is a selfish agent and wants to minimize his sharing cost with the other items packing in the same bin. In this paper, we focus on designing a new mechanism (a payoff rule) for selfish bin packing, called modified Dutch treatment mechanism. We first show that the pure Nash equilibrium exists and it can be obtained in polynomial time. We then prove that under the new mechanism, the price of anarchy is between 1.47407 and 1.4748, improving the known results.

Keywords

Selfish bin packing Mechanism Nash equilibrium Price of anarchy (PoA) 

Notes

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Mathematical ScienceOcean University of ChinaQingdaoPeople’s Republic of China

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