Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
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In this paper, three-sided stable matching problem is discussed, in which two sets, \(V_1\) and \(V_2\) are cooperative partners, and the agent of the other set U has a strict preference to the agents of set \(V_1\) and set \(V_2\) respectively. On the other side, the agents of set \(V_1\) and set \(V_2\) have a strict preference to the agent of set U . About this three-sided matching problem, this paper gives the definition of stable matching, proves that the problem must have a stable matching, and gives an algorithm that can obtain a stable matching.
KeywordsThree-sided matching Stable matching Algorithm
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