Moral Blameworthiness, Quality of Will, and Akratic Action

  • E. J. CoffmanEmail author
Paper for Forum

How does moral blameworthiness relate to quality of will? Following Peter Strawson, many theorists of moral responsibility endorse the following thesis: every morally blameworthy action manifests a morally objectionable quality of will.1 After clarifying this popular thesis—which I call the “Manifestation of Ill Will Requirement”—I defend a new argument against it that focuses on two kinds of akratic action. A portion of this argument against the Manifestation of Ill Will Requirement resembles an argument suggested by Michael McKenna and subsequently defeated by Justin Capes.2After reviewing both McKenna’s argument and Capes’ successful objection to it, I explain why Capes’ objection to McKenna’s argument does not also impugn the new argument against the Manifestation of Ill Will Requirement. Finally, working under the plausible assumption that morally blameworthy action is somehow closely related to morally objectionable quality of will, I address the following question: What is the...


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of TennesseeKnoxvilleUSA

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