Advertisement

Husserl’s 1901 and 1913 Philosophies of Perceptual Occlusion: Signitive, Empty, and Dark Intentions

  • Thomas ByrneEmail author
Article

Abstract

This paper examines the evolution of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perceptual occlusion. This task is accomplished in two stages. First, I elucidate Husserl’s conclusion, from his 1901 Logical Investigations, that the occluded parts of perceptual objects are intended by partial signitive acts. I focus on two doctrines of that account. I examine Husserl’s insight that signitive intentions are composed of Gehalt and I discuss his conclusion that signitive intentions sit on the continuum of fullness. Second, the paper discloses how Husserl transforms his 1901 philosophy in his 1913 revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation, affirming that the occluded parts of perceptual objects are intended by empty contiguity acts. I demonstrate how he overturns the two core doctrines of his theory from the Investigations in these revisions, claiming that empty intentions are not composed of Gehalt and asserting that those acts break with the continuum of fullness. Husserl implements these changes to solve problems that arise from his recognition of two new kinds of intentions; darker and completely dark acts. Finally, in the conclusion, I cash out this analysis, by indicating that, in 1913, Husserl transforms his theory of fulfillment on the basis of his new insights about empty acts.

Notes

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Witold Plotka, Daniel Murphy, Dermot Moran, Julia Jansen, Ullrich Melle, Claudio Majolino, and the anonymous reviewer.

Funding

Postdoctoral Research Grant From KU Leuven Internal Fund; Postdoctoral Research Grant from “Talent Search Project”, University of Macau.

References

  1. Berghofer, P. (2018). Husserl’s concept of experiential justification: What it is and why it matters. Husserl Studies, 34(2), 145–170.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bernet, R. (2003). Desiring to know through intuition. Husserl Studies, 19(2), 153–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Hua XX-1. Husserl, E. (2002). Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erster Teil. Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuauflage der Logischen Untersuchungen. U. Melle (Ed.). Den Haag: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  4. Hua XX-2. Husserl, E. (2005). Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Zweiter Teil. Texte für die Neufassung der VI. Untersuchung. Zur Phänomenologie des Ausdrucks und der Erkenntnis. U. Melle (Ed.). Den Haag: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  5. Melle, U. (1999). Signitive und Signifikative Intentionen. Husserl Studies, 15, 167–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Melle, U. (2002). Husserl’s revisions to the sixth logical investigation. In D. Zahavi & F. Stjernfelt (Eds.), One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl’s Logical Investigations revisited (pp. 111–124). Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Mooney, T. (2010). Understanding and simple seeing in Husserl. Husserl Studies, 26(1), 19–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Mulligan, K. (1995). Perception. In D. W. Smith & B. Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Husserl (pp. 168–238). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Natorp, P. (1888). Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode. Freiburg: Mohr.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy and Religious Studies Department, E21-4101 Faculty of Arts and HumanitiesUniversity of MacauTaipaChina

Personalised recommendations