Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names

  • Ignacio García-JuradoEmail author
  • Luciano Méndez-Naya


In this paper we revisit the rule of k names from a game theoretic perspective. This rule can be described as follows. Given a set of candidates for a position, a committee (formed by the proposers) selects k elements of that set using a screening rule; then a single individual from outside the committee (the chooser) chooses for the position one of the k selected candidates. In this context we first give conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then we provide conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria when the screening rule is \(\pi \)-majoritarian. Finally, we show that when the chooser can strategically appoint a delegate to choose on behalf of him, the conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria are weaker.


Rule of k names Screening rule Subgame perfect equilibrium Strong equilibrium Delegation 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de MatemáticasUniversidade da CoruñaA CoruñaSpain
  2. 2.Departamento de Economía CuantitativaUniversidade de Santiago de CompostelaSantiago de CompostelaSpain

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