Journal of Grid Computing

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 97–118 | Cite as

End-to-End Voting with Non-Permissioned and Permissioned Ledgers

  • Stefano Bistarelli
  • Ivan Mercanti
  • Paolo Santancini
  • Francesco SantiniEmail author


We propose a decentralised end-to-end voting platform (from voter to candidate) based on the block-chain technology. In particular, we study and exploit both the non-permissioned ledger of Bitcoin, and the MultiChain permissioned ledger. We describe the main architectural choices behind the two implementations, including the pre-voting and post-voting phases. Similar approaches are not as decentralised as our application, where it is possible to directly cast a vote to the block-chain, without any intermediate level. Benefits and drawbacks of each implementation are explained. The Bitcoin block-chain consists in a large number of already available nodes in the related peer-to-peer network; moreover, its reliability and resistance to attacks are also well established. With MultiChain we instead exploit a fine-grained permission system: MultiChain is a permissioned public ledger. Hence, with it we can also satisfy two more properties of end-to-end voting systems: uncoercibility and receipt-freeness and data confidentiality and neutrality. Moreover, we can avoid costs and price fluctuations related to Bitcoin.


E-voting Distributed ledger Permissioned block-chain Bitcoin Coloured coin MultiChain 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and Computer ScienceUniversity of PerugiaPerugiaItaly

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