Asia-Pacific Financial Markets

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 229–252 | Cite as

Large Shareholding and Firm Value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

  • Mona Mortazian
  • Seyedeh Asieh H. TabaghdehiEmail author
  • Bryan Mase


This paper investigates the impact of non-managerial and managerial blockholders on the value of the firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This study mainly investigates whether the effect of blockholders on firm value is due to the AIM high ownership concentration and low investor protection. The primary empirical finding, using GMM, justifies that non-managerial and managerial blockholders in the AIM affect the firm value in different ways. Non-managerial blockholders in the AIM improve the firm value by monitoring managers when their block sizes are up to 32%. However, when their block sizes exceed 32%, the blockholders expropriate other shareholders.


Corporate governance Alternative Investment Market (AIM) Managerial blockholders Firm value Tobin’s Q Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 

JEL Classification

G23 G32 


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Copyright information

© Springer Japan KK, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mona Mortazian
    • 1
  • Seyedeh Asieh H. Tabaghdehi
    • 2
    Email author
  • Bryan Mase
    • 1
  1. 1.Brunel University LondonUxbridgeUK
  2. 2.Regents University LondonLondonUK

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