Experimental Economics

, Volume 22, Issue 4, pp 815–833 | Cite as

The effects of make and take fees in experimental markets

  • Vincent Bourke
  • Mark DeSantis
  • David PorterEmail author
Original Paper


We conduct a series of experiments to examine the effects of the make and take fee structure currently used by equity exchanges in the U.S. We examine the effects of these fees on measures of market quality (efficiency, book depth, and the bid-ask spread). We find spreads to be smaller in the presence of make and take fees, and we note that this fee structure seems to induce buyers (moreso than sellers) to compete for rebates from the exchange leading to higher prices and lower profits. To test whether our results are due to the make and take fee structure or are artefacts of trading fees in general, we performed a second set of experiments in which traders on both sides of a transaction were assessed an identical fee. These identical trading fees do not appear to significantly affect our market quality measures.


Exchange fee structures Market quality Market design 

JEL Classification

C9 G4 G1 

Supplementary material

10683_2018_9574_MOESM1_ESM.docx (1.6 mb)
Supplementary material 1 (DOCX 1649 kb)


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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.OrangeUSA

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