When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to Rossi
- 49 Downloads
NH:R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some [moral] norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to violations of N (Fritz and Miller 2018: 119).
We maintain that the hypocritical blamer has an unfair differential blaming disposition, or DBD: he is unfairly disposed to blame others, but not himself, for violations of some norm N (122). In virtue of this, he implicitly rejects the equality of persons with respect to N, which grounds the right to blame for violations of N. By implicitly rejecting that which grounds this right, the hypocritical blamer forfeits his right to blame for violations of N (125–127).
Benjamin Rossi (2018) has recently offered several criticisms of this view. We defend our account from Rossi’s criticisms and emphasize our account’s unique advantage: explaining why hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame.
We are grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper by Steve McFarlane, Justin Capes, and Maggie O’Brien.
- Bell M (2013) The standing to blame: a critique. In: Coates DJ, Tognazzini NA (eds) Blame: its nature and norms. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 263–281Google Scholar
- Fritz KG, Miller DJ (2018) Hypocrisy and the standing to blame. Pac Philos Q 99:118-139Google Scholar
- Fritz KG, Miller DJ (forthcoming) The unique badness of hypocritical blame. Forthcoming in Ergo.Google Scholar