Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 21, Issue 5, pp 1219–1232 | Cite as

“Microaggressions: A Kantian Account”

  • Ornaith O’DowdEmail author


In this paper, I offer an explanation of the moral significance of microaggressions, seemingly minor incidents in which someone is demeaned in virtue of an oppressed social identity, often without the full awareness of the perpetrator. I argue for a broadly Kantian account of the wrongs of microaggressions and the moral responsibilities of various actors with respect to these incidents.


Microaggressions Oppression Kant Responsibility 



Ancestors of the present work were presented at The Pacific APA in 2013 and the Pacific Society for Women in Philosophy in 2012; thanks to audience members for their feedback, and to Kate Abramson for helpful written comments. I would also like thank this journal’s anonymous reviewers for their comments, which improved the paper a great deal.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Cincinnati Blue Ash CollegeCincinnatiUSA

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