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Erkenntnis

pp 1–19 | Cite as

Reducing Contrastive Knowledge

  • Michael CohenEmail author
Original Research

Abstract

According to one form of epistemic contrastivism, due to Jonathan Schaffer, knowledge is not a binary relation between an agent and a proposition, but a ternary relation between an agent, a proposition, and a context-basing question. In a slogan: to know is to know the answer to a question. I argue, first, that Schaffer-style epistemic contrastivism can be semantically represented in inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic, a recent implementation of inquisitive semantics in the framework of dynamic epistemic logic; second, that within inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic, the contrastive ternary knowledge operator is reducible to the standard binary one. The reduction shows, I argue, that Schaffer’s argument in favor of contrastivism is compatible with a binary picture of knowledge. This undercuts the force of the argument in favor of contrastivism.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Johan van Benthem, Ray Briggs, Ivano Ciardelli, Krista Lawlor, Lisa Modifica, Jonathan Schaffer and and two anonymous referees of this journal for many helpful comments, suggestions and corrections on earlier versions of this article.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Stanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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