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Why Explanatory Considerations Matter

  • Miloud BelkonieneEmail author
Original Research


This paper aims at elucidating the connection between explanatory considerations and epistemic justification stipulated by explanationism which take epistemic justification to be definable in terms of best explanations. By relying on the notion of truthlikeness, this paper argues that it is rational for a subject to expect the best explanation she has for her evidence to be more truthlike than any of the other potential explanations available to her by virtue of containing a class of propositions that, given her evidence, she is justified in believing. Based on this elucidation of the connection between explanatory considerations and epistemic justification, an explanationist account of the evidential support relation is then offered.



Thanks are due to Professors Gianfranco Soldati, Fabian Dorsch (1974–2017), Lara Buchak and two anonymous referees from this journal for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université de FribourgFribourgSwitzerland

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