On Dummett’s Pragmatist Justification Procedure
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I show that propositional intuitionistic logic is complete with respect to an adaptation of Dummett’s pragmatist justification procedure. In particular, given a pragmatist justification of an argument, I show how to obtain a natural deduction derivation of the conclusion of the argument from, at most, the same assumptions.
I received very helpful comments and suggestions from members of the research group “Logik und Sprachtheorie” in Tübingen. I am indebted in particular to Peter Schroeder-Heister, who suggested to me the idea of pragmatist canonical arguments with complex conclusions, and to Luca Tranchini, who read and made comments on early drafts. Funding was provided by Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (91562976).
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