The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation
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In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
I would like to thank Matthew Chrisman, Davide Fassio, Robin McKenna, Veli Mitova, Andrea Robitzsch, Melanie Sarzano, Marie van Loon, and the audiences at the University of Southampton (Epistemic and Practical Normativity Workshop, June 2015), at the University of Erlangen (Ethics of Mind Conference, August 2017) and the University of Munich (ECAP, August 2017) for helpful discussions, comments and references. This article has also very much benefited from the insightful suggestions and criticisms of two anonymous reviewers. I thank them too.
Funding was provided by Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung (Grant No. PP00P1_157436)
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