Puzzling Pierre and Intentional Identity
This paper concerns Kripke’s puzzle about belief. I have two goals in this paper. The first is to argue that two leading approaches to Kripke’s puzzle, those of Lewis and Chalmers, are inadequate as they stand. Both approaches require the world to supply an object that the relevant intentional attitudes pick out. The problem is that there are cases which, I argue, exhibit the very same puzzling phenomenon in which the world does not supply an object in the required way. The second goal is to draw out a more general lesson about Kripke’s puzzle. I argue that Kripke’s puzzle should be understood as intimately related to a phenomenon known as ‘intentional identity’, and that an adequate account of Kripke’s puzzle should be extensible to cases in which the relevant attitudes are empty (not, prima facie, about anything that exists).
Thanks to Daniel Nolan, Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Alan Hájek, David Braddon-Mitchell, David Ripley, Philip Pettit, Pär Sundström, Clare Due, two anonymous referees for Erkenntnis, and an audience at the Australian National University for helpful feedback and discussion on the material in this paper.
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