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Erkenntnis

pp 1–12 | Cite as

A Stalnaker Semantics for McGee Conditionals

  • Kurt NorlinEmail author
Original Research
  • 15 Downloads

Abstract

The semantics Vann McGee gives for his 1989 conditional logic is based on Stalnaker’s 1968 semantics but replaces the familiar concept of truth at a world with the novel concept of truth under a hypothesis. Developed here is a semantics of the standard type, in which sentences are true at worlds, only with additional constraints imposed on the accessibility relation and the selection function. McGee conditionals of the form A ⇒ X are translated into Stalnaker conditionals of the form \( \Box \)A > X. An interpretation of the semantics is provided, and a few implications for the theory of indicative conditionals and their probabilities are noted.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Vann McGee, J. Karel Lambert, Hannes Leitgeb, John Cantwell, Wolfgang Spohn, Branden Fitelson, Jeffrey Barrett and especially Peter Woodruff for helpful exchanges, and to two Erkenntnis referees for detailed comments that led to significant revisions, especially in the last section.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bittner Development GroupIrvine and Redwood CityUSA

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