Logical Principles of Agnosticism
Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer to it. In particular, I advance two logical norms of agnosticism, where the first one allows us to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about the conclusion of a valid argument and the second one allows us to assess situations in which the subject is agnostic about one of the premises of a valid argument.
KeywordsSuspended judgment Bridge-principles Normativity of logic
This paper was presented at the Workshop em Filosofia e Probabilidade (PUCRS Porto Alegre, Brazil) and the Bonn/Cologne Research Colloquium (University of Bonn/University of Cologne) respectively. I would like to thank Andre Neiva and Felipe Medeiros for their comments in the former occasion, and Thomas Grundmann, Sven Bernecker, Jan Constantin, Jens Kipper, Dominik Balg, Elke Brendel, Maximilian Zachrau, Gregor Damschen and Lisa Benossi in the latter. I would also like to thank Amy Flowerree and two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions and comments on a previous version of this paper.
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