, Volume 84, Issue 1, pp 1–19 | Cite as

Chance, Resiliency, and Humean Supervenience

  • Patryk Dziurosz-SerafinowiczEmail author
Original Research


This paper shows how a particular resiliency-centered approach to chance lends support for two conditions characterizing chance. The first condition says that the present chance of some proposition A conditional on the proposition about some later chance of A should be set equal to that later chance of A. The second condition requires the present chance of some proposition A to be equal to the weighted average of possible later chances of A. I first introduce, motivate, and make precise a resiliency-centered approach to chance whose basic idea is that any chance distribution should be maximally invariant under variation of experimental factors. Second, I show that any present chance distribution that violates the two conditions can be replaced by another present chance distribution that satisfies them and is more resilient under variation of experimental factors. This shows that the two conditions are an essential feature of chances that maximize resiliency. Finally, I explore the relationship between the idea of resilient chances so understood and so-called Humean accounts of chance—one of the most promising recent philosophical accounts of chance.



I would like to especially thank Jan-Willem Romeijn, Richard Pettigrew, and Rafal Urbaniak for incredibly helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am also indebted to the anonymous referees of Erkenntnis for detailed comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and JournalismUniversity of GdanskGdanskPoland

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