Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration
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This paper proposes a simple framework consisting of a law enforcement model in which criminal organizations (Mafias) can collaborate with each other to control an illegal market. Within this framework, we investigate two different situations: (1) a single monopolistic criminal organization operation or (2) an organization collaborating with another criminal organization. Depending on the quality of the controlled illegal market, the welfare implications of these scenarios vary. This paper also investigates an incentive for criminal organizations to engage in endogenous cooperation. As a result, we explore how criminal organizations’ incentives coincide with social welfare implications.
KeywordsCriminal organization Gang Law enforcement Monopolization Cooperation
I am grateful to two anonymous referees and editor-in-chief Giovanni B. Ramello. I would also like to thank Koichi Suga and participants in the annual meetings of the European Law and Economics Association, the Asian Law and Economics Association and the Japanese Law and Economics Association for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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