Advertisement

European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 57–88 | Cite as

Case selection and judicial decision-making: evidence from French labor courts

  • Claudine DesrieuxEmail author
  • Romain Espinosa
Article
  • 60 Downloads

Abstract

Using a database on French labor courts between 1998 and 2012, we investigate case selection and judicial decision-making. In France, judges are elected at the labor court level on lists proposed by unions, and litigants can first try to settle their case before the judicial hearing. We show that the ideological composition of the court indirectly impacts the settlement behavior of the parties but has no influence on the decision made in court. In addition, parties have self-fulfilling behavior and adapt to institutional rules. When they anticipate long judicial procedures at court, they settle more frequently and only require judicial hearings for complex cases. The duration to decide these complex cases is longer, explaining why they observe (and build their anticipation on) long case duration. Our empirical strategy uses probit, ordered probit and triprobit estimations to control for case selection.

Keywords

Settlement Case duration Judicial proceedings Labor courts Unions 

JEL Classification

K31 K41 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees and Claude Fluet, Nuno Garoupa, Bruno Deffains, Daniel Klerman, Mathieu Lefebvre, Cécile Bourreau-Dubois, Marc Ferracci, Roberto Galbiati and Samuel Ferey for their insightful comments, participants at the seminars in CRED-Paris II, ERUDITE-Paris Est, BETA-Lorraine University and Columbia University, as well as participants to the 3rd International Workshop on Economic Analysis of Litigation, the 32nd Conference of the Journées de Microéconomie Appliquée, the 64th annual Conference of the Association Française de Science Économique, and the 31st annual conference of the European Association of Law and Economics. We are also grateful to two anonymous referees, whose comments greatly contributed to the final version of this work.

Supplementary material

10657_2018_9594_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (282 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 282 KB)

References

  1. Anwar, S., Bayer, P., & Hjalmarsson, R. (2012). The impact of jury race in criminal trials. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, First published on-line.Google Scholar
  2. Bafumi, J., Gelman, A., Park, D. K., & Kaplan, N. (2005). Practical issues in implementing and understanding bayesian ideal point estimation. Political Analysis, 3, 171–197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Berlemann, M. & Christman, R. (2016). Determinants of in-court settlement: Evidence from a german trial court. Working Paper.Google Scholar
  4. Boyd, C. L., Epstein, L., & Martin, A. D. (2010). Untangling the causal effects of sex on judging. American Journal of Political Science, 54(2), 389–411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Brace, P., & Hall, M. G. (1995). Studying courts comparatively: The view from the american states. Political Research Quarterly, 48(1), 5–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Brace, P., Yates, J., & Boyea, B. D. (2012). Judges, litigants, and the design of courts. Law & Society Review, 46(3), 497–522.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Brace, P. R., & Hall, M. G. (1997). The interplay of preferences, case facts, context, and rules in the politics of judicial choice. The Journal of Politics, 59(4), 1206–1231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Clermont, K. & Eisenberg, T. (2002). Plaintiphobia in the appellate courts: Civil rights really do differ from negotiable instruments? University of Illinois Law Review.Google Scholar
  9. Cooter, R., & Ulen, T. (2016). Law and Economics (6th ed.). Berkeley: Berkeley Law Books.Google Scholar
  10. Daughety, A. F., & Reinganum, J. F. (2012). Settlement. In: Procedural Law and Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing.Google Scholar
  11. De Maillard Taillefer, L. & Timbart, O. (2009). Les affaires prud’homales en 2007. Technical Report 105, Infostat, Ministère de la Justice.Google Scholar
  12. Desrieux, C., & Espinosa, R. (2017). Enjeux et perspective de l’analyse économique des conseils de prud’hommes. Revue française d’économie, 1, 137–168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Eisenberg, T. (1991). The relationship between plaintiff success rates before trial and at trial. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society), 154(1), 111–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Eisenberg, T. (1994). Negotiation, lawyering, and adjudication: Kritzer on brokers and deals. Law & Social Inquiry, 19(1), 275–299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Eisenberg, T. & Farber, H. S. (1997). The litigious plaintiff hypothesis: Case selection and resolution. Rand Journal of Economics, 28.Google Scholar
  16. Eisenberg, T., & Lanvers, C. (2009). What is the settlemen rate and why should we care? Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 6, 111–146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Epstein, L., & Kobylka, J. (1994). The Supreme Court and legal change: Abortion and the death penalty. University of North Carolina Press.Google Scholar
  18. Epstein, L., Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (2013). The Behavior of Federal Judges: A theoretical and empirical study of rational choice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  19. Epstein, L., & Lindquist, S. (2016). The Oxford handbook of U.S. judicial behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Espinosa, R. (2017). Constitutional Judicial Behavior: Exploring the Determinants of the Decisions of the French Constitutional Council. Review of Law and Economics, 13(2).Google Scholar
  21. Espinosa, R., Desrieux, C., & Ferracci, M. (2017a). Labor Market and Access to Justice. International Review of Law and Economics (first on-line publication).Google Scholar
  22. Espinosa, R., Desrieux, C., & Wan, H. (2017b). Fewer Courts, less justice? Evidence from the 2008 French Reform of labour Courts. European Journal of Law and Economics, 43(2), 195–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Farhang, S., & Wawro, G. (2004). Institutional dynamics on the u.s. court of appeals: Minority representation under panel decision making. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20(2), 299–330.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Fraisse, H., Kramarz, F., & Prost, C. (2014). Labor disputes and labor flows. Industrial Labor Relations Review, forthcoming.Google Scholar
  25. Garoupa, N., Gomez-Pomer, F., & Grembi, V. (2011). Judging under political pressure: An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the spanish constitutional court. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 29(3), 513–534.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Glynn, A. N., & Sen, M. (2015). Identifying judicial empathy: Does having daughters cause judges to rule for women’s issues? American Journal of Political Science, 59(1), 37–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Gross, S., & Syveryd, K. (1991). Getting to no: A study of settlement negotiations and the selection of cases for trial. Michigan Law Review, 90, 319–393.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Guillonneau, M., & Serverin, E. (2015). Les litiges individuels du travail de 2004 à 2013: des actions moins nombreuses mais toujours plus contentieuses. Technical Report 135, Infostat, Ministère de la Justice.Google Scholar
  29. Hall, M. G. (1987). Constituent influence in state supreme courts: Conceptual notes and a case study. The Journal of Politics, 49(4), 1117–1124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Hall, M. G. (1992). Electoral politics and strategic voting in state supreme courts. The Journal of Politics, 54(2), 427–446.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Hay, B., & Spier, K. (1998). Settlement of Litigation. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, number 442. MacMillan Reference Limited.Google Scholar
  32. Hitt, M. P. (2013). Presidential success in supreme court appointments: Informational effects and institutional constraints. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 43(4), 792–813.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Huang, K. (2008). How legal representation affects case outcomes: An empirical perspective from taiwan. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 5, 197–238.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Huang, K.-C., Chen, K.-P., & Lin, C.-C. (2010). An empirical investigation of settlement and litigation: The case of taiwanese labor disputes. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 7(4), 786–810.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Ichino, A., Polo, M., & Rettore, E. (2003). Are judges biased by labor market conditions? European Economic Review, 47(5), 913–944.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Kaplan, D., Sadka, J., & Silva-Mendez, J. L. (2008). Litigation and settlement: New evidence from labor courts in mexico. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 5(2), 309–350.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Kessler, D., Meites, T., & Miller, G. P. (1996). Explaining deviations from the fifty-percent rule: A Multimodal approach to the selection of cases for litigation. The Journal of Legal Studies, 25(1), 233–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Klerman, D. (2012). The selection of 13th-century disputes for litigation. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 9(2), 320–346.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Kulik, C., Perry, E. L., & Pepper, M. B. (2003). Here comes the judge: The influence of judge personal characteristics on federal sexual harassment case outcomes. Law and Human Behavior, 27(1), 69–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Lederman, L. (1999). Which cases go to trial: An empirical analysis of predictors of failure to settle. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 49(2), 315–358.Google Scholar
  41. Lim, C. S. (2013). Preferences and incentives of appointed and elected public officials. American Economic Review, 103, 1360–1397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Loewenstein, G., C., I. S. C., & Babcock, L. (1993). Self-serving assessments of fairness and pretrial bargaining. The Journal of Legal Studies, 22(1), 135–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Marinescu, I. (2011). Are judges sensitive to economic conditions? Evidence from uk employment tribunals. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 64(4), 673–698.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Martin, A. D., & Quinn, K. M. (2002). Dynamic ideal point estimation via markov chain monte carlo for the u.s. supreme court, 1953–1999. Political Analysis, 10, 134–153.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Martin, A. D., Quinn, K. M., & Epstein, L. (2005). The median justice on the united states supreme court. North Carolina Law Review, 5, 1275–1320.Google Scholar
  46. Peresie, J. (2005). Female judges matter: Gender and collegial decision making in the federal appellate courts. The Yale Law Journal, 114(7), 1759–1790.Google Scholar
  47. Perry, H. (1994). Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  48. Priest, G. L., & Klein, B. (1984). The selection of disputes for litigation. The Journal of Legal Studies, 13(1), 1–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Pérez-Liñán, A., Ames, B., & Seligson, M. A. (2006). Strategy, careers, and judicial decisions: Lessons from the bolivian courts. The Journal of Politics, 68(2), 284–295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Segal, J. A., & Spaeth, H. J. (1993). The Supreme Court and the attitudinal model. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  51. Segal, J. A., & Spaeth, H. J. (1996). The influence of stare decisis on the votes of united states supreme court justices. American Journal of Political Science, 40(4), 971–1003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Serverin, E., & Valentin, J. (2009). Licenciement et recours aux prud’hommes, questions de mesure. In B. Gomel, D. Méda, & E. Serverin (Eds.), L’emploi en ruptures. Paris: Dalloz.Google Scholar
  53. Shayo, M., & Zussman, A. (2011). Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(3), 1447–1484.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Songer, D. R., & Lindquist, S. A. (1996). Not the whole story: The impact of justices’ values on supreme court decision making. American Journal of Political Science, 40(4), 1049–1063.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Waldfogel, J. (1995). The selection hypothesis and the relationship between trial and plaintiff victory. Journal of Political Economy, 103(2), 229–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CRED - Université Paris IIParisFrance
  2. 2.CNRS, CREM - Université Rennes 1RennesFrance

Personalised recommendations