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Designs, Codes and Cryptography

, Volume 87, Issue 12, pp 2847–2884 | Cite as

Practical \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \)-based encryption balancing security-risk versus efficiency

  • Ron SteinfeldEmail author
  • Amin Sakzad
  • Raymond K. Zhao
Article
  • 77 Downloads

Abstract

Middle-product learning with errors (\(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \)) is a variant of the \(\mathsf {LWE}\) problem introduced at CRYPTO 2017 by Rosca et al. (Advances in cryptology—CRYPTO, Springer, Berlin, 2017). Asymptotically, the theoretical results of Rosca et al. (2017) suggest that \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \) gives lattice-based public-key cryptosystems offering a ‘security-risk vs. efficiency’ trade-off: higher performance than cryptosystems based on unstructured lattices (\(\mathsf {LWE}\) problem) and lower risk than cryptosystems based on structured lattices (Polynomial/Ring \(\mathsf {LWE}\) problem). However, although promising in theory, Rosca et al. (2017) left the practical implications of \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \) for lattice-based cryptography unclear. In this paper, we show how to build practical public-key cryptosystems with strong security guarantees based on \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \). On the implementation side, we present optimised fast algorithms for computing the middle-product operation over polynomial rings \({\mathbb {Z}}_q[x]\), the dominant computation for \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \)-based cryptosystems. On the security side, we show how to obtain a nearly tight security proof for \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \) from the hardest Polynomial LWE problem over a large family of rings, improving on the loose reduction of Rosca et al. (2017). We also show and analyze an optimised cryptanalysis of \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \) that narrows the complexity gap between best known attacks on \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \) and Polynomial \(\mathsf {LWE}\). To evaluate the practicality of \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \), we apply our results to construct, implement and optimise parameters for a practical \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \)-based public-key cryptosystem, \(\mathsf {Titanium} \), and compare its benchmarks to other lattice-based systems. Our results show that \(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \) offers a new ‘security-risk vs. efficiency’ trade-off in lattice-based cryptography in practice, not only asymptotically in theory.

Keywords

Middle-product learning with errors (\(\mathsf {MP} \text{- }\mathsf {LWE} \)Lattice-based cryptography Quantum-resistant cryptography Public-key encryption KEM Cryptography implementation 

Mathematics Subject Classification

68P25 

Notes

Funding

Funding was provided by Australian Research Council (Grant No. DP150100285).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Information TechnologyMonash UniversityClaytonAustralia

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