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Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 30, Issue 4, pp 383–406 | Cite as

Parliamentary and semi-presidential advantages in the sovereign credit market: democratic institutional design and sovereign credibility

  • Isa CamyarEmail author
Original Paper
  • 28 Downloads

Abstract

We propose that institutional differences in executive-legislative relations generate heterogeneity in the creditworthiness of democracies in the sovereign credit market. In particular, there is a credibility advantage for parliamentarism relative to presidentialism, because the former, with stronger parties, elongates policy-makers’ time horizons and lowers their discount rate, thereby enhancing their ability to signal the credibility of their commitment to debt repayment. Our Heckman selection analysis of democracies from 1990 to 2012 confirms the existence of parliamentary advantage in sovereign credibility, and it also reveals a semi-presidential advantage relative to presidentialism. Our study contributes to the recent stream of research that problematizes the democracy/autocracy dichotomy in the study of sovereign credibility.

Keywords

Sovereign credibility Democracy types Parliamentarism Presidentialism Semi-presidentialism 

JEL Classification

F34 D02 P48 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.St. Francis CollegeBrooklynUSA

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