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Climatic Change

, Volume 126, Issue 3–4, pp 279–292 | Cite as

The crucial role of policy surveillance in international climate policy

  • Joseph E. AldyEmail author
Article

Abstract

An extensive literature shows that information-creating mechanisms enhance the transparency of and can support participation and compliance in international agreements. This paper draws from game theory, international relations, and legal scholarship to make the case for how transparency through policy surveillance can facilitate more effective international climate change policy architecture. I draw lessons from policy surveillance in multilateral economic, environmental, and national security contexts to inform a critical evaluation of the historic practice of monitoring and reporting under the global climate regime. This assessment focuses on how surveillance produces evidence to inform policy design, enables comparisons of mitigation effort, and illustrates the adequacy of the global effort in climate agreements. I also describe how the institution of policy surveillance can facilitate a variety of climate policy architectures. This evaluation of policy surveillance suggests that transparency is necessary for global climate policy architecture.

Keywords

International Monetary Fund World Trade Organization Climate Policy Climate Change Policy International Climate Policy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Scott Barrett, Roger Fouquet, Bard Harstad, Trevor Houser, Jonathan Pershing, Billy Pizer, Rob Stavins, Rob Stowe, three referees and the editor, and participants at the 2008 Third Atlantic Workshop on Energy and Environmental Economics provided comments on an earlier version of this paper. Sarah Cannon, Napat Jatusripitak, Ryan Powell, and Sarah Szambelan provided valuable research assistance. Support for this work has been provided by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.John F. Kennedy School of GovernmentHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.Resources for the FutureWashingtonUSA
  3. 3.National Bureau of Economic ResearchCambridgeUSA

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