In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s (Axiomathes, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9392-4) attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science (NIS) from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi (J Gen Philos Sci 47(1):59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence of this argument, namely, that they should not believe their own brand of scientific antirealism.
New induction Problem of unconceived alternatives Problem of unconceived objections Scientific antirealism Scientific realism
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I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers of Axiomathes for their helpful comments.
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